

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 ABU DH 01191 040621Z

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ACTION NEA-07

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 EUR-08 PM-03 INR-05 CIAE-00

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R 030845Z JUN 75 ZFG

FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2999

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY DOHA

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MANAMA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY MUSCAT

AMEMBASSY SANAA

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

S E C R E T ABU DHABI 1191

LIMDIS

BEIRUT ALSO PASS BAGHDAD

NOFORN

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINT, PINS, PFOR, MU, YS, KU

SUBJ: DHOFAR WAR - PERSPECTIVE FOR ABU DHABI

REF: (A) MUSCAT 585 (B) KUWAIT 2208

1. EMBASSY KUWAIT HAS OPENED INTERESTING DISCUSSION ON BEST WAY OF DEALING WITH OMAN INSURGENCY, AND WE TOO WOULD LIKE TO KICK IN OUR TWO CENTS WORTH.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 ABU DH 01191 040621Z

2. WE AGREE THAT PDRY IS HEART OF PROBLEM, AND ALSO WITH KUWAIT'S PERCEPTIVE OBSERVATION THAT COMMUNIST VICTORIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA WILL GIVE RENEWED HEART TO GUERILLAS EVERYWHERE, INCLUDING THOSE IN DHOFAR. EMBASSY KUWAIT IS ALSO PROBABLY RIGHT, WE THINK, IN SAYING THAT AS LONG AS PDRY WANTS TO, IT HAS CAPABILITY OF KEAHING DHOFAR INSURGENCY ALIVE.

3. QUESTION IS, WHAT IS BEST WAY OF DEALING WITH PDRY? HERE WE FIND OURSELVES NOT ENTIRELY PERSUADED BY KUWAIT'S THESIS THAT IN PURSUING CARROT-STICK APPGMACH TOWARD PDRY, WHAT IS NEEDED NOW IS THE DANGLING OF YET ANOTHER CARROT IN FRONT OF THE RECALCITRANT SOUTHERN YEMENIS. IT SEEMS TO US THAT A GOOD DEAL OF THIS HAS ALREADY BEEN DONE IN PAST YEAR, SO FAR WITH NO VISIBLE RESULTS. NOT ONLY HAVE WE HAD ARAB LEAGUE MEDIATION EFFORT AND EGYPTIAN/SAUDI/UAEG PROFFERED FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, BUT GOVERNMENTS THROUGHOUT GULF HAVE BEEN UNILATERALLY LECTURING PDRY EMISSARIES WHEN THEY TRAVEL THROUGH, AND SOME--SPECIFICALLY UAEG--HAVE PAINTED ROSY PICTURE OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL BENEFITS THAT WOULD FLOW IF ONLY PDRY WOULD MEND ITS WAYS. WE DO NOT SEE EXACTLY WHAT KUWAIT'S INITIATIVE COULD DO AT THIS STAGE WHERE EGYPTIANS HAVE APPARENTLY SO RECENTLY FAILED. ON CONTRARY, THERE MAY BE DANGER THAT FURTHER CARROT DANGLING JUST NOW COULD EMBOLDEN PDRY TO THINK THAT POLICIES OF GULF STATES ARE CHANGING AND THAT PDRY WILL BE ABLE, WITH A LITTLE MORE PERSISTENCE, TO HAVE ITS CAKE AND EAT IT TOO.

4. THE ANALOGY OBVIOUSLY CANNOT BE CARRIED TOO FAR, BUT IT STRIKES US THAT DRAMATIC CHANGE OF POLICY WE HAVE RECENTLY WITNESSED IN BAGHDAD HAS COME ABOUT NOT BECAUSE OF CONCILIATORY INITIATIVES FROM OUTSIDERS BUT AS RESULT OF HARD-HEADED APPRAISAL BY SADDAM REGIME ITSELF OF PRICE IRAQ WAS PAYING FOR POLICIES THAT HAD PLUNGED IT INTO CONFRONTATION WITH ITS NEIGHBORS AND ISOLATION FROM REST OF ARAB WORLD. TX DOUBT PDRY DIFFERS IN MANY IMPORTANT RESPECTS FROM IRAQ, YET PERHAPS IT IS SIMILAR IN SENSE THAT IT TOO WILL EVENTUALLY RESPOND TO ADVERSITY CAUSED BY BAD POLICIES. PDRY DOES NOT HAVE KURDISH REBELLION NAGGING AT IT, BUT IS GETTING NOWHERE WITH ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND IT CANNOT DERIVE MUCH SUSTAINED SATISFACTION FROM ANATHEMA IN WHICH IT IS HELD BY ALMOST ALL OTHER ARAB GOVERNMENTS.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 ABU DH 01191 040621Z

5. THERE ARE SOME WHO RECOMMEND THAT WE FORGET ABOUT CARROT AND BRING OUT STICK. SHAIKH FAISAL AL-QASIMI, C OF S OF ABU DHABI DEFENSE FORCE, PUT FORWARD TO US OTHER DAY NOW POPULAR THESIS THAT BRITISH DO NOT REALLY WANT TO BRING WAR IN OMAN TO AN END SINCE BRITISH INFLUENCE IN OMAN WOULD THEN RAPIDLY DECLINE. HE SAID BRITISH KNOW ONLY WAY TO END WAR IS TO CARRY IT INTO PDRY ITSELF-- "MAKE THEM HURT." SHAIKH FAISAL IS ABU DHABI'S VERY OWN

CURTIS LEMAY AND AS SUCH IS STIMULATING ANTIDOTE TO SHAIKH ZAYID WHOSE APPROACH SOMETIMES VEERS TOWARD TRYING TO CONQUER ONE'S ADVERSARIES BY SMOTHERING THEM WITH MONEY.

6. BUT WE DON'T THINK FAISAL'S PRESCRIPTION IS RIGHT ONE EITHER. IN FIRST PLACE IT SEEMS UNCERTAIN THAT ANY OF MILITARY FORCES PRESENTLY WITHIN RANGE COULD MOUNT EFFECTIVE OPERATION AGAINST PDRY. SECONDLY, AND MORE IMPORTANT, ANY SUCH OPERATION WOULD PROBABLY RALLY SUPPORT INTERNALLY FOR ADEN REGIME AND COULD EVEN ELICIT GREATER SYMPATHY AND SUPPORT FOR IT FROM OTHER ARAB GOVERNMENTS. WE THINK OMAN WOULD END UP THE LOSER IN THIS KINDN OFAGGRESSIVE POLICY.

7. WHAT SEEMS INDICATED TO US IS POLICY DESIGNED TO KEEP PDRY IN CONTINUED POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC QUARANTINE FOR TIME BEING. ADENIS KNOW THAT CARROTS THAT HAVE BEEN DANGLED ARE STILL THERE TO BE PICKED UP WHENEVER THEY CHOOSE TO CHANGE THEIR POLICY. LET STICK CONTINUE TO TAKE FORM OF SLENDER BENEFITS PDRY IS DERIVING FROM DEPENDENCE ON USSR AND ISOLATION FROM REST OF WORLD. IT MAY TAKE AWAHILE LONGER, BUT EVENTUALLY WE THINK THISPOLICY WILL YIELD RESULTS. IN MEANTIME, WHILE WE GRANT POINT THAT PDRY CAN KEEP DHOFAR GUERRILLA MOVEMENT ALIVE, IT SEEMS TO US FROM EMBASSY MUSCAT'S REPORTING DYAT MOVEMENT IS CONTAINABLE AND DOES NOT AT PRESENT POSE SIGNIFICANT THREAT TO SULTAN'S REGIME. STERNER

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